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Abstract It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to
choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters’ pref-
erences is complete, the voters’ preferences on alternatives induce voters’ preferences
over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural
question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule
employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself, when
it is also used for choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as
inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray
(Econometrica 68: 981–995, 2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally
self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we introduce to our
society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient
social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectiv-
ity becomes more interesting and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social
choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe
all of them.
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1 Introduction
It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice
rule itself. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning con-
sistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the
society’s original choice problem does not choose itself, when it is also used in choos-
ing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this
choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale.
This idea of self-selectivity for social choice functions was first analyzed by
Koray (2000). Barberà and Beviá (2002) and Barberà and Jackson (2004) also con-
sider it but from a different perspective. Jackson (2001) in his survey “A crash course
on implementation theory” underlined the importance of the idea.
The difficulty of defining such a concept lies in the necessity to construct a profile
on the set of available social choice functions starting from the profile on the existing
alternatives. Koray (2000) resolved this difficulty by a clever use of duality which will
be described below.
Let A stand for the set of alternatives from which the society will be eventually
choosing, and let A stand for the finite nonempty set of social choice functions (SCFs)
available to this society at the moment of choice. Koray showed that the society’s pref-
erence profile R on A will induce a set of “dual” preference profiles on A. According
to him, if the agents have complete information about other agents’ intentions, it is
natural to expect that the agents will rank the SCFs in A in accordance with what
these SCFs will choose from A. This framework allows to apply the consistency test
introduced above. If an SCF in A passes this test, that is, selects itself from A at a
dual preference profile RA, then it is called self-selective at the preference profile R
on A relative to A. Moreover, an SCF F is said to be universally self-selective if it is
self-selective at each preference profile on any finite nonempty set A relative to any
finite set A of available SCFs containing F . Koray (2000) confined itself to neutral
SCFs only, so that it was only the size of the alternative set A that mattered rather than
the names of the alternatives in A.
The main result in Koray (2000) is the impossibility theorem stating that, when
the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to three, a unanimous and neutral
SCF is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Unel (1999) and Koray
and Unel (2003) showed also that impossibility still survives in the tops-only domain.
Allowing social choice rules to be multi-valued also does not lead to any new interest-
ing examples and one ends up with a rediscovery of the Condorcet rule as the maximal
neutral and self-selective social choice rule (Koray 1998).
These theorems showed that the concept of self-selectivity was made too strong to
be useful. In particular, according to the definition of self-selectivity given above, a
self-selective rule must select itself even when grouped together with most ridiculous
rules that no society will ever contemplate using. Moreover some voting rules are
unavailable to the society on legitimacy grounds. Also, it would be very difficult to
argue against the decision of a society to rule out the usage of inefficient social choice
rules.
Since the use of inefficient rules was essential for the proof of Koray’s impossibil-
ity theorem it has become gradually clear that for obtaining an interesting concept of
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self-selectivity the sets A cannot be kept arbitrary. In the present paper we make an
initial attempt to pursue this idea.
The main model example that we have in mind throughout the paper restricts
rival SCFs to singleton-valued refinements of the Pareto correspondence. In par-
ticular, we prove that if a SCF is a refinement of the Pareto correspondence and
chooses itself from any subset of a sufficiently representative set of such refine-
ments, then it is either dictatorial or else Pareto anti-dictatorial. The latter chooses
the worst Pareto optimal alternative for the selected voter. Unlike the standard anti-
dictatorial SCFs, such restricted anti-dictatorship constitutes a rather complex
arrangement made by the society in such a way that the choice is always efficient,
depends on the opinion of all agents, not just one, and does not give anybody an unfair
advantage.
This special case is, of course, important in itself, however we explore self-
selectivity in a much broader framework. We introduce a rather large family of suit-
able restrictions that yield an interesting class of non-dictatorial self-selective SCFs
(which are not universally self-selective, of course, as the self-selectivity test is not
universal any more). Each restriction of rival SCFs, against which the self-selectiv-
ity is to be tested, in the present study corresponds to a particular set of norms on
the part of the society. We start with a social choice correspondence π and con-
fine our test functions to singleton-valued refinements of π . Thus π is to be thought
of as a constitutional rule reflecting the norms that the society wishes to adhere
to. We assume that the correspondence π is neutral, tops-inclusive and hereditary.
These properties that our constitutional correspondence is required to possess are
all consistent with our conception of social desirability as will be seen later in the
paper.
Moreover, the family of restrictions of test functions via constitutional correspon-
dences is sufficiently wide to also include the unrestricted domain as well as the tops-
only domain as its special cases. Thus, we obtain the main results of Koray (2000)
and Koray and Unel (2003) as corollaries to our main result, hence also providing
alternative proofs to those results.
Both Koray (2000) and Koray and Unel (2003) dealt exclusively with neutral SCFs.
Here, for the simplicity of exposition, we also assume neutrality. However, neutral-
ity is not crucial for the self-selectivity results obtained in this paper. The notion of
self-selectivity can be extended to the non-neutral case in an easy and natural manner.
Interested readers are referred to the preprint (Koray and Slinko 2001).
An alternative approach to the “choosing how to choose” problem is pursued by
Houy (2003, 2006). He assumes that individuals do not pay attention to immediate
consequences of the choice but form their preferences on the basis of the intrinsic
values of the rules alone: for example some voters might have ethical objections to
dictatorship despite the benefit that it can bring to them personally. This is, of course,
an important point. Nevertheless, the immediate consequences also cannot be com-
pletely ignored and in the future a combined approach might appear which takes into
account both immediate consequences and ethical objections.
A preliminary versions of this paper was published as a working paper of CIREQ
(Koray and Slinko 2006).
123
132 S. Koray, A. Slinko
2 Basic notions and examples
Let N stand for a finite nonempty society of voters of cardinality n which will be
fixed throughout the paper. For each finite nonempty set of alternatives A, we denote
the set of all linear orders on A by L(A). Any n-tuple R = (R1, . . . , Rn) of linear
orders Ri will be called a profile, and the set of all profiles will be denoted by L(A)n .
Denoting, as usual, the set of all positive integers by N, we set Im = {1, 2, . . . , m} for





a social choice correspondence (SCC), if and only if, for each m ∈ N and R ∈ L(Im)n ,
one has F(R) ⊆ Im . If F(R) is a singleton for each m and R, we refer to the SCC F
as a social choice function (SCF) and write F(R) = a instead of F(R) = {a}. Social
choice correspondences are often called social choice rules (SCR). We will use terms
SCC and SCF, when we want to stress their multivaluedness or siglevaluedness of the
corresponding SCR, respectively.
Before proceeding any further, let us note the two aspects in which our definition
of an SCR differs from some definitions found in the literature. Firstly, unlike the
framework, when the set of alternatives is assumed to be fixed but the set of voters can
vary, we have a fixed set of voters and a variable set of alternatives. This reflects the
fact that we study how a society chooses a voting rule. During this process the society
is fixed but the exact set of alternatives at this stage is unknown and cannot be known
because the voting rule must be applicable to all voting situations that might emerge in
the future. Thus we consider a sequence of finite sets of alternatives I1, I2, . . . , Ik, . . .,
rather than a single fixed one. When the choice problem with m alternatives is defined,
the component of the rule that maps L(Im)n into 2Im is used. Most common SCFs
can be used for sets of alternatives of variable sizes. Secondly, the common domain
of our SCRs consists of profiles on representative sets Im , one for each cardinality
m ∈ N, rather than on arbitrary finite sets. In the case of a neutral SCR, this is nothing
but a more compact way of describing how the SCR acts on the profiles composed
of linear orders on an arbitrary finite set A. In the first four sections we will restrict
ourselves to considering only neutral SCRs. In the last section we show how the case
of non-neutral SCRs can be handled.
Below are several examples of SCFs and SCCs that are capable of choosing an
alternative from sets of alternatives of different sizes.
Example 1 Dictatorial and anti-dictatorial SCFs play an important role. They are
defined as follows. For a given profile R,
Di (R) = max Ri ,
ADi (R) = min Ri ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. McCabe-Dansted and Slinko (2006) describe 26 most common SCRs.
All of them can be used to choose from sets of alternatives of variable sizes.
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Example 2 An important SCC, which will later be denoted by P , is defined as follows:
for any profile R the set P(R) consists of all Pareto optimal alternatives. Later we will
generalise this example. Another important SCC T is defined as follows. By T (R) we
denote the set of all alternatives which are top ranked by at least one agent.
These two SCCs P and T will be important later. Obviously T (R) ⊆ P(R) for
every profile R.
Let us recap what it means for SCR to be neutral. For each m ∈ N, let Sm stand for
the symmetric group of all permutations on Im . Given R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ L(Im)n
and σ ∈ Sm , we define a new profile Rσ = (Rσ1 , . . . , Rσn ) such that k Rσi  if and only
if σ−1(k) Ri σ−1(), where i ∈ N and k,  ∈ Im . An SCR F is said to be neutral at a
profile R if, for any m ∈ N, R ∈ L(Im)n and σ ∈ Sm
F(Rσ ) = σ(F(R)). (1)
An SCR F is said to be neutral if it is neutral at any profile.
In the definition of a social choice rule it was convenient to use a generic set of
alternatives Im . However, in practice we may have to deal with various sets of alterna-
tives, thus we have to show how to use a SCR F to select from an arbitrary finite set
of alternatives A given a preference profile on A. The natural way of doing this is, of
course, by indexing the elements of A using the initial segment Im of N with m = |A|
and then paying attention to indices only. This indexation is given by any bijection
µ : A → Im and in practice it corresponds to assigning to each candidate their order
on a ballot. Given this bijection, any profile Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ L(A)n will induce
a profile Qµ = (Qµ1 , . . . , Qµn ) ∈ L(Im)n such that, for any i ∈ N and k,  ∈ Im ,
k Qµi  ⇐⇒ µ−1(k) Qi µ−1(). (2)
We may now define
Fµ(Q) = µ−1(F(Qµ)). (3)
If F is neutral, then it is straightforward to see that Fµ = Fν for any two bijections
from A to Im . This means that F treats all candidates equally, regardless of their
position on the ballot. Thus in the neutral case the superscript µ can be dropped from
Fµ and we may assume that F is defined on any finite set of alternatives A.
If we abandon the neutrality assumption, then such a transfer of an SCF F is
no longer uniquely determined, Fµ will depend on µ. Hence in this case the set of
alternatives must be indexed. Our main results concerning self-selective SCRs, with
appropriate definition of self-selectivity, will still hold in the non-neutral case but for
the clarity of exposition and convenience of the reader, we delegate this case to Sect. 5.
In the sequel we will use the concept of isomorphism for profiles which we give in
the following definition.
Definition 1 Let A and B be two sets of alternatives of the same cardinality. Let
R = (R1, . . . , Rn) and Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) be profiles on A and B, respectively. Then
R and Q are called isomorphic if there is a bijection σ : A → B such that a Ri a′ if
and only if σ(a) Qi σ(a′) for all i ∈ N .
123
134 S. Koray, A. Slinko
The following proposition can now be proved as an easy exercise.
Proposition 1 Let A and B be two sets of alternatives of the same cardinality. Let
R = (R1, . . . , Rn) and Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) be two isomorphic profiles on A and B,
respectively with σ : A → B being the corresponding bijection. Then for any neutral
SCF F we have σ(F(R)) = F(Q).
Now suppose that the society N , endowed with a preference profile on an m-ele-
ment set of alternatives A, from which the choice is to be made, is also to choose an
SCF that will be employed to make its choice from A. Suppose that a nonempty finite
set A of SCFs is available to N for this purpose. We assume that the agents in N are
only interested in the outcomes that the SCFs from A will produce and thus rank SCFs
accordingly. Therefore any agent i ∈ N will also have a preference relation RAi on A
such that for any F, G ∈ A
F RAi G ⇐⇒ F(R) Ri G(R). (4)
This preference relation RAi will be a complete preorder and may not be, in general,
antisymmetric. Indeed, two different SCFs F, G ∈ A may well choose the same alter-
native a ∈ A, in which case the i th agent will be indifferent between F and G. By
breaking ties and introducing linear orders on indifference classes we may obtain a
number of linear orders compatible with RAi . When we do it for all i ∈ N , we obtain
a profile from L(A)n . Any profile, so obtained, will be called a profile dual to R on
the set of SCFs A. Let us denote the set of all such profiles as L(A, R).
We have now an apparatus to formalise the concept of self-selectivity. If A is a
finite set of SCFs, then we say that F is self-selective at a profile R relative to A if
and only if there exists a dual profile R∗ ∈ L(A ∪ {F}, R) such that F(R∗) = F . We
say that F is self-selective at a profile R if it is self-selective at R relative to every
finite set of SCFs A. Finally F is said to be universally self-selective if and only if F
is self-selective at each profile R ∈ L(A).
It may be worthwhile to emphasise that in the definition of self-selectivity of F we
only require that F chooses itself at just one (not all) dual profile. A natural question
arises, what will happen if we require that F selects itself at all dual profiles. It is not
difficult to see that this leads to a vacuous concept. Indeed, if we compare F with
SCFs F1, . . . , Fn , which at some profile (unanimous, for example), all select the same
winner, then the set of dual profiles will consist of all possible profiles and F selects
itself at all of them if and only if it is constant.
Another important thing to note is that we are talking about sets and not multisets
here. This means, in particular, that we just cannot repeat F or any other SCF in A
several times. The importance of this will become clear in Sect. 3.
In other words, universal self-selectivity requires that F passes the self-selectivity
test at each preference profile and against any finite set of test functions. From Koray
(2000) we know that the only unanimous neutral universally self selective SCFs are
the dictatorial ones. There are two kinds of natural restrictions that one can resort to
in an attempt to avoid this impossibility result. The first one is to restrict the domain
of preference profiles at which self-selectivity is required. The second is to restrict the
class of SCFs against which the self-selectivity is to be tested. In this study we will be
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interested in the latter approach. This interest does not only stem from our intention
to escape from impossibility results but we also believe that this approach is actually
consistent with the realities of a modern society.
Indeed, every society has certain normative criteria according to which the notion
of social acceptability is reflected at the constitutional level. This naturally confines
the set of SCFs that may be used by that society, from the very outset, to a certain
subclass of all SCFs, ruling out all other SCFs as socially unacceptable. We would
find it very difficult on our part to argue, for example, against the decision of a society
to adopt Pareto efficiency as a constitutional principle and thus restrict itself to using
efficient SCFs only. In this case the set of acceptable SCFs would consist of all sin-
gleton-valued refinements of the Pareto correspondence. For such a society it will be
natural to test self-selectivity of an SCF against Paretian SCFs only.
Let F be a nonempty set of neutral SCFs which will be used to denote the set of test
functions for self-selectivity. We say that F is F-self-selective at a profile R ∈ L(A)n
if and only if F is self-selective at R relative to A ∪ {F} for any finite subset A of F .
We say that F is F-self-selective if it is F-self-selective at any profile R. We illustrate
the concept with the following three examples.
Example 3 Let Q = (Q1, . . . , Q19) be the following profile:
Q1−Q4 Q5−Q8 Q9−Q13 Q14−Q19
a b c d
c a a b
b c b a
d d d c
Let B be the Borda rule, C be any Condorcet consistent rule, E be the Plurality rule,
and R be the Plurality with Runoff rule. The latter starts as Plurality but instead of
determining the top alternative straightaway it determines the two top alternatives and
determines a winner by a simple majority vote between them. The second round is not
needed if the top Plurality candidate gets more than 50% of the vote in the first round.
Applying these rules we obtain B(Q) = a, C(Q) = b, R(Q) = c, E(Q) = d. The
same voters will rank the rules in the dual profile Q as follows:
Q∗1−Q∗4 Q∗5−Q∗8 Q∗9−Q∗13 Q∗14−Q∗19
B C R E
R B B C
C R C B
E E E R
We see that B(Q) = B, C(Q) = C , R(Q) = R, E(Q) = E . Each rule is
self-selective at Q.
Example 4 (Koray 2000) Any dictatorial or anti-dictatorial SCF is universally self-
selective.
Finally, we give an example when the Borda rule is not self-selective.
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Example 5 Let D = {D1, . . . , Dn} be the class of all dictatorial SCFs. Then it is easy
to see that the Borda rule is not D-self-selective. To illustrate this let us denote the
















where Borda rule will choose D1.
In this study the notion of social acceptability at the constitutional level will be
represented via a neutral SCC π . Once the society chooses such a constitutional cor-
respondence, the set F of its admissible SCFs will be restricted to singleton-valued
refinements of π . We will refer to such SCFs as to selections of π . We also wish to
secure that F fully reflects π in the sense that there is no smaller constitution that F
is consistent with. Formally, we require that for every profile R
⋃
F∈F
F(R) = π(R) (5)
at each profile R, in which case we say that F is π -complete.
We illustrate this concept with the following example.
Example 6 Let D = {D1, . . . , Dn} be the class of all dictatorial SCFs. Then D is
T -complete. D will not be P-complete though since it is possible that a Pareto-
optimal alternative is not anybody’s first preference.
Now let us turn our attention to the properties that the correspondence π is expected
to possess. This correspondence should be both sufficiently restrictive and sufficiently
flexible. It is to be restrictive to reflect certain normative criteria. If π is the universal
correspondence, which we denote by , i.e., π(R) = A for every set of alternatives
A and every profile R ∈ L(A)n , then π is vacuous from the normative viewpoint. On
the other hand, π should be sufficiently flexible as it is meant to be a rule at the consti-
tutional level. For example, if π itself is always singleton-valued, then π itself would
be the only admissible SCF available to the society to resolve any choice problem
whatsoever. Moreover, if a constitution is to respect preferences of individuals, then
it does not seem too-far-fetched to require that there should be no agent whose best
outcome is constitutionally ruled out at some preference profile. This means that π(R)
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should contain all top-ranked outcomes at any profile R. This leads to the requirement
that π must be satisfy T (R) ⊆ π(R). This condition is normally referred to as tops-
inclusiveness. In Sect. 4 we will introduce our version of tops-inclusiveness which is
slightly stronger.
We will also require that our constitutional correspondence behave consistently
under restrictions of preference profiles to subsets of alternatives chosen by it. More
specifically, we will say that an SCC π is hereditary if and only if for every profile
R and every nonempty subset ∅ 
= X ⊆ π(R) there holds π(R|X ) = X , where R|X
is the restriction of the profile R to the set of alternatives X . This requirement is very
natural. Indeed, if an alternative was eligible for choice for the society at an early
stages of selection, it should remain eligible for choice when not eligible alternatives
are eliminated.
In the sequel, we assume that our constitutional correspondence π is tops-inclusive
and hereditary. We note that our “role models” P , T , and  all satisfy these require-
ments. The collection F of all admissible SCFs under π social choice test-functions
will be always assumed π -complete.
We note that, when π =  and F is the set of all selections of  we obtain the
framework studied by Koray (2000) and his main result as a corollary. Similarly taking
π = T and F to be the set of all selections of T , we obtain the framework of the paper
by Koray and Unel (2003) and their main result as a corollary too.
Let us also define some more SCCs which will play a role in the rest of the paper.
Firstly, we remind to the reader that the upper contour set U (a, L) of an alternative a
relative to a linear order L is defined as U (a, L) = {x ∈ A | x L a}.
Let q ≥ 1 be a positive integer and R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ L(A)n be a profile. An





U (a, Ri )
)
≤ q.
In particular, for q = 1 we note that 1-Pareto optimal elements are the classical Pareto
optimal ones the set of which we denoted by P(R). Let also Pq(R) be the set of all
q-Pareto optimal elements of R. In particular, P1(R) = P(R). An alternative a ∈ A
is said to get at least one qth degree approval if
n
min
i=1 card (U (a, Ri )) ≤ q.
Let Tq(R) be the set of all alternatives which get at least one qth degree approval. In
particular, T1(R) is the set of elements who are ranked first by at least one agent, thus
T1(R) = T (R). Obviously,
T1(R) ⊆ T2(R) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Tk(R) ⊆ · · ·
We note also that Tq(R) ⊆ Pq(R).
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3 Self-selectivity and resistance to cloning
Here we will show that self-selectivity is closely related with two other properties
of SCFs that often appear in the literature: resistance to cloning of alternatives and
Arrow’s choice axiom. Cloning of alternatives is one of the many forms of manipu-
lation that exist (Laffond et al. 1996; Tideman 1987; Zavist and Tideman 1989). For
example, producing a clone of a leading candidate in the race splits her vote and may
allow the second best candidate in the race to win the election. We treat cloning in
generalised terms. In particular, withdrawal of a candidate from the race may also
change the outcome of the election and this move can also be manipulative (see, e.g.
Moulin 1988). We treat withdrawals as a particular type of cloning when an alternative
is replaced with zero clones.
Let us describe the cloning procedure formally. Let R be a profile on a set of alter-
natives A = {a1, . . . , ak}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k we introduce the set of alternatives A′i
which is either empty or A′i = {ai1, ai2, . . . , aiki } with ki ≥ 1 and ai = ai1. We set
A′ = A′1 ∪ · · · ∪ A′k . In the profile R we drop all alternatives ai , for which A′i = ∅
and replace each alternative ai , for which A′i is non-empty, with a linear order on A′i
(not necessarily the same for different occurrences of ai ) and this gives us a profile
R′ on the set of alternatives A′ which we will call a cloned profile. We emphasise
the following two features of any cloned profile: in each linear order of R′ all clones
of the same alternative are standing “together” but the order on these clones may be
different from one linear order of R′ to another. Another important thing to note is
that a subset of A is contained in A′; this is the set of alternatives which have not been
“withdrawn”. The possibility to withdraw an alternative is absent in the definitions
of cloning used in Laffond et al. (1996), Tideman (1987), and Zavist and Tideman
(1989). Our definition is more general.
Definition 2 Let R be a profile on a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , ak} and C be an
SCC. We say that C is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives at a profile R if for
any cloned set of alternatives A′ = A′1 ∪ · · · ∪ A′k , where ai /∈ C(R) implies A′i = ∅
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there exists a cloned profile R′ on A′ for which
C(R) ∩ A′ = C(R′). (6)
We say that an SCC C is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives if it is resistant
to cloning of essential alternatives at any profile R.
As in the case of self-selectivity, it is important to note that we require the existence
of just one cloned profile R′ with the property (6). Asking for all profiles to satisfy
this condition makes the concept vacuous again.
It may be worthwhile to note that (6) represents a weak version of Arrow’s choice
axiom (Arrow 1959), which he proved to be equivalent to a rationalisability of the
SCC C by a social welfare function.
Example 7 Already mentioned SCCs T , P and  are resistant to cloning of essential
alternatives.
Proof Suppose that a ∈ T (R). Then a = max Ri for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let a = a j .
Suppose A′j is not empty and therefore includes a. We order all elements of A′j so that
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a = a j = a j1 is on the top of A′j . Let R′ be any cloned profile where this order on
A′j is chosen. Then a will be on the top of R′i , hence a ∈ T (R′). On the other hand,
no other element of A′j will be on the top of any R′j since a majorises it in every R′j .
Thus (6) is satisfied for T .
The proof for P is similar and the resistance to cloning of essential alternatives for
 is obvious. 
Proposition 2 Any SCC which is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives is
hereditary.
Proof Let C be a SCC which is resistant to cloning of essential alternatives, and let R
be a profile on A = {a1, . . . , ak}, and let X ⊆ C(R). Suppose without loss of general-
ity that X = {a1, . . . , aq} for q ≤ k. Then the restriction R′ = R|X of R onto the set of
alternatives X is a cloned profile on A′, where |A′1| = · · · = |A′q | = 1 and |A′q+1| =
· · · = |A′k | = 0. Moreover, R′ is the only cloned profile on A′. Since C is resistant
to cloning of essential alternatives The Eq. (6) holds and C(R′) = C(R) ∩ A′ = X ,
which proves the proposition. 
An important link between self-selectivity and resistant to cloning of essential alter-
natives is presented in the following theorem which will give us a non-trivial example
of self-selective SCFs.
Theorem 1 Let π be any neutral SCC which is resistant to cloning of essential alter-
natives and F be any class of SCFs, each of which is a selection of π . Then for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n the two SCFs given by
F(R) = min Ri |π(R), G(R) = max Ri |π(R) (7)
are F-self-selective.
Proof We will prove the statement only for the first function. The proof for the second
function is similar. Let R be a profile on a set of alternatives A and A = {F1, . . . , Fk} ⊆
F be any finite subset of F not containing F . Let us also denote F0 = F . Suppose
Fj (R) = a j , where j = 0, 1, . . . , k and some a j ’s may coincide. Without loss of gen-
erality we may assume that a0, a1, . . . , ap are distinct and that aq ∈ {a0, a1, . . . , ap}
for all q > p. Let F j be the set of all SCFs from {F0} ∪ A which select a j for
all j = 0, 1, . . . , p. Note that F = F0 ∈ F0. By their definition, all F j ’s for
j = 0, 1, . . . , p are non-empty, let us denote the elements of F j as Fj1, Fj2, . . . , Fjk j
with Fj = Fj1.
Let B = {a0, a1, . . . , ap}. Since every SCF from A ∪ {F} is a selection of π , we
note that B ⊆ π(R). To construct a dual profile R∗, firstly, we have to restrict R to the
set B, then to change a j ∈ B into F j , treating F j as equivalence classes, and then
to break ties selecting linear orders on each F j (which may be different for different
linear orders of R∗).
Every dual profile R∗ corresponds to a cloned profile R′ isomorphic to R∗. We set
A′j = {a j1, a j2, . . . , a jk j } for j = 0, 1, . . . , p and A′q = ∅ for p < q ≤ m. To obtain
the i th linear order R′i of the profile R′, we set ars > auv if and only if Frs > Fuv
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in R∗i . By resistance to cloning of essential alternatives, there exists a cloned profile
R′ on A′ = A′0 ∪ · · · ∪ A′p such that π(R) ∩ A′ = π(R′). By the construction of A′
we have B = π(R) ∩ A′, hence B = π(R′). This implies that
F(R′) = min R′i |π(R′) = a0
and therefore F(R∗) = F0 = F . Hence F chooses itself at R∗. 
The SCFs introduced in Theorem 1 will be called π -antidictatorship and π -
dictatorship of the i th voter, respectively. A certain degree of clone resistance of
π is necessary for this theorem to be true. We illustrate this in the following example.






and let π = T2. Then a = B(R) is the Borda winner, b = E(R) is the Plurality
winner, and π(R) = {a, b, c}. Let D1 be the dictatorship of the first voter and A2 be
the π -antidictatorship of the second voter. Then D1(R) = a and A2(R) = c.
Since voters are indifferent between B and D1, there are eight dual profiles on






None of the eight dual profiles have A2 ∈ T2(R∗), hence A2(R∗) = B and A2 is not
self-selective at R relative to F = {B, D1, E}.
We see that it is exactly the failure of resistance to cloning of essential alternatives
that leads to the failure of F to be self-selective. This example can be easily generalised
to show that
Proposition 3 A π -antidictatorship is not self-selective for π = Tq, when q > 2, and
for π = Pq, when q ≥ 2.
4 The main theorem
In Theorem 1 we introduced the π -antidictatorship and π -dictatorship, respectively.
The π -dictatorship is not very interesting since for any tops-inclusive SCC π it will
give us the ordinary dictatorship. Not so with the π -antidictatorship. One of the most
interesting SCFs of this kind is the SCF given by
F(R) = min Ri |P(R),
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i.e., Pareto antidictatorship. This SCF chooses the worst Pareto optimal alternative for
the i th voter. So the i th voter is a Pareto anti-dictator.
Unlike the standard anti-dictatorial SCFs, the π -antidictatorship constitutes a rather
complex arrangement made by the society in such a way that the choice is always effi-
cient, depends on the opinion of all agents, not just one, and does not give anybody
an unfair advantage.
Now we discuss the condition of tops-inclusiveness in detail. We say that π is
tops-inclusive if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(i) T (R) ⊆ π(R) for every profile R.
(ii) If π(R) ⊆ P(R) does not hold for at least one profile R ∈ L(A)n , then
π(R) ⊇ T2(R) for every profile R ∈ L(A)n .
We have already discussed condition (i) above. As for condition (ii), it looks like a
technical condition that we need for our results to hold. However, it does have a sim-
ple meaning based on the notions of efficiency and fairness at the constitutional level.
Before the discussion of its meaning, let us note that in this study we regard the Pareto
correspondence as our primary “role model” for the constitutional correspondence π .
And, as long as π is Paretian, condition (ii) is vacuous and may be forgotten. However,
if π includes not only all Pareto optimal alternatives but also at least one a ∈ π(R),
which is not Pareto optimal, then it is not top-ranked by any of the agents at R. If
some agent’s kth ranked alternative, with k ≥ 2, is included in π(R) although it is
not efficient, then one could argue on the grounds of fairness that no alternative that is
ranked kth or higher should be excluded from π(R), i.e., the inclusion Tk(R) ⊆ π(R)
must hold. Condition (ii) is the weakest of this kind and, as long as the correspondence
π satisfies the two conditions we do not want to complicate the matter any further.
The main result of this paper presented in a theorem below states that π -
antidictatorships are effectively the only non-trivial examples of self-selective SCFs
if we restrict the set of rival SCFs to selections of π .
Theorem 2 Suppose n ≥ 3. Let π be any neutral, hereditary and tops-inclusive SCC
and F be a selection of π which is F-self-selective for some π -complete set F of
SCFs. Then either F is dictatorial or π -antidictatorial.
We will give a proof in the next section. Now we are going to single out some
interesting cases which fall under this general result.
Corollary 1 Let F be a universally self-selective SCF. Then it is dictatorial or anti-
dictatorial.
This generalises the main result of Koray (2000), where unanimity was assumed
which precluded antidictatorial SCFs from being a possibility. We obtain this corollary
assuming π = . Another consequence of the main result is as follows:
Corollary 2 Let F be a selection of T . Let D = {D1, . . . , Dn} be the set of all
dictatorial SCFs and F is any set of SCFs containing D. Then F is F-self-selective if
and only if it is dictatorial or T -antidictatorial.
This generalises the main result of Koray and Unel (2003) in several directions. We
obtain their result by setting π = T .
123
142 S. Koray, A. Slinko
Corollary 3 Let F be a selection of P. Let F be any set of SCFs which is P-complete.
Then F is F-self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial or P-antidictatorial.
Finally, we will mention several of SCCs for which dictatorial SCFs are still the
only self-selective SCFs even if unanimity is not postulated.
Corollary 4 Let n ≥ 3 and let π be either Tq or Pq , where q ≥ 2, and F be a
selection of π which is F-self-selective for some π -complete set F of SCFs. Then F
is dictatorial.
Proof Since π is neutral, tops-inclusive and hereditary, by Theorem 2 F is either
dictatorial or π -antidictatorial. But we have seen in Proposition 3 that for Tq or Pq ,
where q ≥ 2, all π -antidictatorial SCFs are not self-selective. 
5 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we assume that all conditions of Theorem 2 hold. Let R be a profile. The
alternatives in π(R) will be called π -optimal relative to R. By π−(R) we will denote
the set of all remaining alternatives (which are not thus π -optimal). The following key
lemma relates the condition of F-self-selectivity with the more familiar conceptual
framework of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Lemma 1 Let R ∈ L(Im)n be a profile, and F be an SCF which is F-self-selective
at R. Let B be a subset of Im such that π−(R) ⊆ B ⊆ Im, and C = Im \ B. Then
(F(R) ∈ C) ⇒ (F(R) = F(R|C )). (8)
Proof Let the cardinality of C be k. Suppose F(R) ∈ C . Note that all elements in
C are π -optimal, hence k ≥ 1 as π is tops-inclusive. Since F is π -complete, there
exists a subset G ⊆ F of cardinality k such that F ∈ G and for every a ∈ C there
exists an SCF G ∈ G such that G(R) = a. Let µ : G → C be a bijection such that
µ(G) = G(R).
Let S = R|C be the restriction of R onto C . Then, using the mapping µ−1, as in
(2) we can induce a profile Sµ
−1
on G. Note that Sµ−1 coincides with the unique dual
profile SG as defined in (4). Thus, by F-self-selectivity of F , we have
F(Sµ
−1
) = F(SG) = F.
Having the definition of µ in mind, and (3) we obtain
F(R) = µ(F) = µF(Sµ−1) = Fµ(S).
Due to neutrality of F we have F(R) = F(S), as required. 
We will call the condition (8) the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with
respect to π . We will omit π , if this invites no confusion.
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Corollary 5 Let R ∈ L(Im)n be a profile and F be a selection of π which satisfies
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Then
F(R) = F(R|π(R)).
Proof Since F is a selection of π , F(R) /∈ π−(R). By the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives
F(R) = F(R|Im\π−(R)) = F(R|π(R)), (9)
as required. 
Let F be an SCF and let R be a profile. Then for X ⊆ π(R) we define
cR(X)
def= F(R|X ),
and for every x, y ∈ π(R)
x R y def⇐⇒ cR({x, y}) = x .
By doing this, we attach to every SCF F and every profile R a binary relation R on
π(R).
Lemma 2 Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Then for every profile R the restriction of the binary relation R to π(R) is a linear
order on π(R).
Proof Let x, y ∈ π(R). Then x, y ∈ π(R|{x,y}) since π is hereditary. Since F ia
an SCF, the choice set is always a singleton. Thus we have either cR({x, y}) = x or
cR({x, y}) = y, that is we have either x R y or y R x , and R is complete and
antisymmetric. The reflexivity is obvious. Let us prove the transitivity.
Suppose x R y and y R z, where x, y, z ∈ π(R) are distinct. Then x, y, z ∈
π(R|{x,y,z}) since π is hereditary. Let us prove that cR({x, y, z}) = x . Indeed, if
cR({x, y, z}) = z, then the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies cR({y, z})
= z which contradicts to y R z. If cR({x, y, z}) = y, then the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives implies cR({x, y}) = y which contradicts to x R y. Hence
cR({x, y, z}) = x is proven and then by the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
we get cR({x, z}) = x , i.e., x R z. 
The following proposition reveals the mechanism behind any SCF which is a selec-
tion of π and satisfies the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. It can be viewed
as an extension of Corollary 5.
Proposition 4 Let F be a selection of π satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives. Let R be a profile. Suppose that the elements of π(R) are enumerated so
that π(R) = {b1, . . . , br } with
b1 R b2 R · · · R br .
Then F(R) = cR({b1, . . . , br }) = b1.
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Proof The equality F(R) = cR({b1, . . . , br }) is implied by Corollary 5. Let us prove
cR({b1, . . . , bk}) = b1 by induction on k. If k = 2, then cR({b1, b2}) = b1 is equiva-
lent to b1 R b2. Suppose that cR({b1, . . . , bk}) = b1, let us consider b1, . . . , bk+1. If
cR({b1, . . . , bk+1}) = bk+1, then the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies
bk+1 R bk , the contradiction. Then cR({b1, . . . , bk+1}) ∈ {b1, . . . , bk}. Then by the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
cR({b1, . . . , bk+1}) = cR({b1, . . . , bk}) = b1.
The proposition is proved. 
We will denote the i th voter as i so that N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. It will not lead to a
confusion. We fix π till the end of this section. In the rest of the proof we follow the
ideas of the original proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (1951, 1963). The proof
itself is different since here we have transitivity only on a variable set of alternatives
π(R) which depends on the profile R. We have to be careful about that.
Definition 3 Let F be an SCF. We say that a coalition D ⊆ N is π -decisive for F
and a pair (a, b) of distinct alternatives a, b ∈ Im , if for an arbitrary profile R, such
that a, b ∈ π(R), a Ri b for i ∈ D, and bR j a for j ∈ N \ D, imply a R b. We say
that D is π -decisive for F , if it is π -decisive for every pair of distinct alternatives.
Most of the time our π will be fixed and we will write decisive instead of π -decisive.
Lemma 3 Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
and let D be a coalition. Suppose that there exists a profile R, such that for some
a, b ∈ π(R), a Ri b for i ∈ D, and bR j a for j ∈ N \ D, and a R b. Then D is
decisive for F and the pair (a, b). If the coalition D is proper, i.e ∅ 
= D 
= N , then
the reverse is also true.
Proof Suppose that there exists a profile R, such that a, b ∈ π(R), a Ri b for i ∈ D,
and bR j a for j ∈ N \ D, and a R b. Let R′ be any profile with a, b ∈ π(R′) such
that a, b ∈ π(R′), a R′i b for i ∈ D, and bR′j a for j ∈ N \ D. Then R′|{a,b} = R|{a,b},
whence F(R′|{a,b}) = F(R|{a,b}) = a, and a R′ b.
Suppose now that a proper coalition D is decisive for F and a pair (a, b). Then
both D and N \ D are nonempty. Let us consider any profile R of the following type:
a  b  · · · : agents from D,
b  a  · · · : agent from N \ D.
Then a, b ∈ π(R), since π is tops-inclusive, and hence a R b by the decisiveness
of D. Therefore a profile with the required properties exists. 
Lemma 4 Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Then a coalition D is decisive for F if and only if it is decisive for F and a pair (a, b)
for some distinct alternatives a, b ∈ Im.
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Proof Suppose D is decisive for F and a pair (a, b) of distinct alternatives a, b ∈ Im .
First, we suppose that there exists a profile R, such that a, b ∈ π(R), a Ri b for i ∈ D,
and bR j a for j ∈ N \ D, with a R b. By the definition the latter means that
a = F(R|{a,b}). Let us denote R|{a,b} = P .
Let us consider any profile R′ such that c, d ∈ π(R′), cR′i d for i ∈ D, and d R′j c
for j ∈ N \ D. Let us denote R′|{c,d} = Q. Consider the bijections µ : {a, b} → I2
and ν : {c, d} → I2 such that µ(a) = ν(c) = 1 and µ(b) = ν(d) = 2. By (3)
a = F(P) = Fµ(P) = µ−1 F(Pµ).
Since the profiles Pµ and Qν coincide, we have
F(Q) = Fν(Q) = ν−1 F(Qν) = c.
The latter means c R′ d and by Lemma 3 D is decisive for (c, d).
Let us consider the remaining case, when no profile exists such that a, b ∈ π(R),
a Ri b for i ∈ D, and bR j a for j ∈ N \ D. The neutrality of π then implies that no
profile Q can exist such that c, d ∈ π(Q), cQi d for i ∈ D, and d Q j c for j ∈ N \ D.
Thus, in both cases, D is decisive for F . 
Corollary 6 Let F be an SCF satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Let D be a proper subset of N . Then either D is decisive or its complement N \ D is
decisive.
Proof Suppose that a coalition D is decisive for F and a pair (a, b). Then D is decisive
by Lemma 4. If D is not decisive for F and a pair (a, b), then there exists a profile R
such that a, b ∈ π(R), and a Ri b for i ∈ D, and bR j a for j ∈ N \ D, but b R a.
But now by Lemmata 3 and 4 N \ D is decisive. 
The following Lemmata on the structure of the set of decisive subsets of N will
be proved under the assumption that F is a SCF which satisfies the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives, where π is a neutral, hereditary, and tops-inclusive SCC.
Lemma 5 If a decisive set D = D1 ∪ D2, different from N , is a disjoint union
(D1 ∩ D2 = ∅) of two nonempty subsets D1 and D2, then either D1 or D2 is decisive
as well.
Proof Let N = D1 ∪D2 ∪M, where M = N \D 
= ∅. Consider any profile R such
that for some a, b, c ∈ Im :
a  b  c  · · · : agents from D1,
b  c  a  · · · : agents from D2,
c  a  b  · · · : agents from M.
Then a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π is tops-inclusive. Then b R c as D = D1 ∪D2 is decisive.
If b R a then D2 is decisive and the result is proved. If not, then a R b. Since by
Lemma 2 the relation R is transitive on π(R), a R b and b R c imply a R c,
which means that in this case D1 is decisive. 
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Lemma 6 There exists a singleton v ∈ N such that {v} is decisive.
Proof Let N ′ = N \ {u}, where u ∈ N is arbitrary. Then by Corollary 6 either {u} or
N ′ is decisive. In the first case we are done. In the second, we may repeatedly apply
Lemma 5 to N ′ and then to its decisive subsets until a decisive singleton is obtained.

Lemma 7 Let D1, D2 and D3 be three nonempty disjoint subsets of N such that
N = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3. Then all three subsets cannot be simultaneously decisive.
Proof If this were possible, then consider the following profile R:
a  b  c  · · · : agents from D1,
b  c  a  · · · : agents from D2,
c  a  b  · · · : agents from D3.
Since π is tops-inclusive, the alternatives a, b, c are all π -optimal and, assuming that
all three subsets are decisive, we will have a R c R b R a, which contradicts to
the transitivity of R on π(R) proved in Lemma 3. 
Lemma 8 Let D1 and D2 be two decisive subsets of N such that D1 ∪ D2 
= N .
Then the union D1 ∪ D2 is decisive.
Proof Suppose first that D1 and D2 are disjoint. As D1 ∪ D2 
= N , then M =
N \ (D1 ∪ D2) 
= ∅. By Lemma 7 M is not decisive. But then D1 ∪ D2 = N \ M is
decisive by Corollary 6.
Now let us assume that D1 and D2 have a nonzero intersection. We may also assume
that this intersection is different from both of the sets because otherwise the result is
trivial. Let us consider any profile such that for some alternatives a, b, c ∈ Im
a  b  c  · · · : agents from D1 ∩ D2,
a  c  b  · · · : agents from D1 \ D2,
b  a  c  · · · : agents from D2 \ D1,
c  b  a  · · · : agents from M.
We note that a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π is tops-inclusive. Then a R b since D1 is decisive
and b R c since D2 is decisive. By transitivity of R on π(R) we get a R c and
hence D1 ∪ D2 is decisive. 
Corollary 7 There exists a decisive subset D of N of cardinality n − 1.
Proof This is the same to say that one of the singletons is not decisive. Suppose to
the contrary that all singletons are decisive. Then by Lemma 8 all proper subsets of
N are decisive. This is impossible since by Corollary 6 a subset and its complement
cannot be simultaneously decisive. 
Lemma 9 Let ∅ 
= D1 ⊆ D ⊆ D2 
= N with D1 and D2 being decisive. Then D is
decisive.
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Proof Let us consider any profile such that for some alternatives a, b, c ∈ Im
a  b  c  · · · : agents from D1,
b  a  c  · · · : agents from D \ D1,
b  c  a  · · · : agents from D2 \ D,
c  b  a  · · · : agents from N \ D2.
Since a, b, c ∈ π(R), we get a R b as D1 is decisive and b R c as D2 is decisive.
By the transitivity of R on π(R) we get a R c which means that D is decisive. 
Definition 4 Let F be an SCF. An agent k ∈ N will be called an π -dictator, if for
every profile R and for every pair of two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ π(R) it is true that
a Rkb implies a R b; an agent k ∈ N will be called an π -antidictator, if for every
profile R and for every pair of two distinct alternatives a, b with a, b ∈ π(R) it is true
that a Rkb implies b R a.
The following two propositions are obvious.
Proposition 5 An agent k ∈ N is an π -dictator, if all coalitions in N containing k are
π -decisive. An agent k ∈ N is an π -antidictator, if all coalitions in N not containing
k (including the empty one) are π -decisive.
Now we are ready to prove the main results of this paper.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 2] We will prove that there is either a π -dictator or π -anti-
dictator. Since F is a selection from π and π is tops-inclusive, any π -dictator will be
an ordinary dictator.
Firstly, we note that the existence of a decisive set of cardinality n − 1 is guaran-
teed by Corollary 7. Without loss of generality, we assume that D = {1, . . . , n−1} is
decisive. Then {n} cannot be decisive. By Lemma 6 there is a decisive singleton, it
must be in D; and we may assume that it is {1}. By Lemma 9 all subsets of D, which
contain {1}, are decisive.
Now the key question is whether or not one of the subsets N \ {i} is decisive for
2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Let us assume first that there is such a subset, say N \ {i}. Then every
proper subset of N , containing 1 is contained in either N \ {n} or N \ {i} and by
Lemma 9 is decisive. Hence all proper subsets containing {1} are decisive. It remains
to prove that in this case N itself is also decisive, it would mean that agent 1 is an
π -dictator.
We note first that if π(R) ⊆ P(R) for all profiles R, then N is trivially decisive
because there does not exist such a, b ∈ π(R) that a Ri b for all i ∈ N . If this inclusion
does not hold, then by the second condition of tops-inclusiveness π(R) contains all
first and second preferences. Let us consider any profile of the following type
a  b  c  · · · : agents from N \ {2, 3}
b  a  c  · · · : agent 2,
a  c  b  · · · : agent 3.
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Then a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π(R) contains all first and second preferences. We get a R b
as N \ {2} is decisive and b R c as N \ {3} is decisive. By transitivity we get a R c
which by Lemma 4 means that N is decisive. Thus agent 1 is an π -dictator.
Suppose now that none of the subsets N \ {i} are decisive for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. This
immediately implies that all agents 2, 3, . . . , n−1 are decisive. By Lemma 8 it follows
that every nonempty subset of D is decisive. Then n would be an π -antidictator if and
only if an empty set is decisive.
We note first that if π(R) ⊆ P(R) for all profiles R, then ∅ is trivially decisive.
If not, then π(R) contains all second preferences. Let us consider any profile of the
following type
a  b  c  · · · : agents from N \ {n−1, n−2}
b  a  c  · · · : agent n−1,
a  c  b  · · · : agent n−2.
Then a, b, c ∈ π(R) as π(R) contains all first and second preferences. We get b R a
as {n−1} is decisive and c R b as {n−2} is decisive. By transitivity we get c R a
which by Lemma 4 means that ∅ is decisive. Thus agent n is an π -antidictator. 
6 Conclusion and further research
In this paper the authors have made the first attempt to find a framework in which
non-dictatorial self-selective SCFs may exist. To this end we relaxed the universal
self-selectivity restricting the set of rival SCFs requiring them to be ‘reasonable’ in
the sense that they are selections from a certain well-behaved constitutional corre-
spondence. We indeed discovered some self-selective non-dictatorial SCFs. Further
attempts to find interesting relaxations of universal self-selectivity are encouraged.
We showed that the property of self-selectivity is closely related to some well-known
and well-studied properties of SCFs such that independence of irrelevant alternatives,
resistance to cloning. But, unlike them, self-selectivity can be made rather flexible
since the choice of the set of rival SCFs F can be made in many different ways.
It seems that the property of self-selectivity (as well as resistance to cloning) is
much more compatible with the Condorcet consistent SCFs that with point-scoring
ones. It would be interesting to find out whether or not there are any self-selective
SCFs in the class of Condorcet consistent rules.
Another interesting question that we left open is to characterise all neutral SCCs
which are resistant to cloning of essential alternatives. In particular, we do not know
if T , P and  (and the mirror counterparts of the first two) are the only neutral SCCs
with this propertiy.
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